



The Arbitrariness and Normativity of Social Conventions 
 
NB: This is the accepted version of the paper, ie. before the last round of copy editing. For 
referencing purposes, please use the published version. 
Al-Amoudi, Ismael and Latsis, John 2014. The arbitrariness and normativity of social 
conventions. British Journal of Sociology 65 (2), pp. 358-378.  
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates a puzzling feature of social conventions: the fact that they are both 
arbitrary and normative. We examine how this tension is addressed in sociological accounts 
of conventional phenomena. Traditional approaches tend to generate either synchronic 
accounts that fail to consider the arbitrariness of conventions, or diachronic accounts that miss 
central aspects of their normativity. As a remedy, we propose a processual conception that 
considers conventions as both the outcome and material cause of much human activity. This 
conceptualisation, which borrows from the économie des conventions as well as critical 
realism, provides a novel perspective on how conventions are nested and defined, and on how 
they are established, maintained and challenged. 
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Fundamental concepts such as rules, norms or institutions are often treated as primitive terms 
and used as the unanalysed building blocks of social theory. The focus of this paper – the 
concept of convention – is no exception in this regard.  There are scant explicit references to 
convention as an analytical tool in sociology, nor a well-entrenched ‘sociological’ conception. 
While sociologists might not require a sophisticated understanding of conventions as long as 
they study communities characterised by high levels of social and cultural integration (Cf. 
Archer 2012: 87–96), their working definitions of convention appear limited when it comes to 
analysing situations of conflict between competing conventions as is increasingly the case in 
late modernity, an epoch characterized both by the coexistence of conflicting systems of 
conventions and by unprecedented emphasis on individual choices and identities (Baumann 
2000; Beck 1992; Giddens 1991,  see also Archer 2007 for a critique from a realist 
perspective).. 
Nevertheless the study of the nature of social conventions has enjoyed a resurgence 
both within sociology and economics in the last twenty years
1
, and convention has been 
proposed as the foundational concept of a promising new theoretical and empirical approach 
to the social sciences. Originating with the work of a group of sociologists and dissident 
economists in France, this new approach (which we refer to as the EC) has been variously 




 Fortunately, ordinary linguistic usage of the term ‘convention’ provides some clues 
that can help to clear the conceptual ground. It presupposes a distinction between 
conventional practices and other forms of rule-bound social behaviour: conventions, it is 
usually supposed, are different from other rules because they are in some sense arbitrary. 
Some event, process or state of affairs X can be described as arbitrary if it might have been 
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otherwise (i.e. if it is not determined by the nature of things). Thus, it is generally agreed 
across theoretical approaches and even disciplines that a convention is not the unique 
response to a given social situation, nor entirely dictated by ahistorical canons of morality. 
The form that a conventional practice takes is seen as doubly contingent: it is the product of 
history rather than nature and its form is underdetermined by the convention’s social function 
(for a realist analysis of the relation between form and function, see Faulkner and Runde 
2009).  
 Despite their arbitrariness, conventions are also widely seen as normatively binding in 
some weak sense.  That is to say, in everyday social interaction, conventions enable and 
constrain behaviour and provide standards against which judgments of appropriateness are 
made. Of course, conventional coordination involves an evaluative judgment of the 
acceptability of a practice by the actors participating in it. In principle, such evaluative 
judgments may be informed by (eudaimonistic) considerations
3
 relative to human flourishing: 
they can be altruistic or egoistic, they can aim for the individual good or for the common 
good, and they may or may not seek to distinguish between relative and ultimate goods (see 
Aristotles’s Nicomachean Ethics).  In practice, however, evaluative judgments draw on a 
mixture of cognitive resources, not all of which are oriented towards conceptions of the good. 
This distinguishes the task of the social theorist from that of the moral philosopher. Whilst the 
latter is concerned primarily with moral justification, the former is concerned with 
disambiguating the various social mechanisms through which conventions weigh on agents’ 
activities. 
Whatever its contingent source, the normative force of a convention is puzzling if we 
accept the view that conventions are arbitrary. Indeed, stating that X is a convention means 
both: (i) that, all other things being equal, I ought to do X rather than some alternative 
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convention Y (or Z), but also (ii) that Y (or Z) would have been appropriate had they been 
adopted by the community in place of X.   
 In this paper, we demonstrate that the conjunction of normativity and arbitrariness 
generates an unexpected tension inherent in the technical usage of the term. This tension is 
then reflected in social scientific attempts to conceptualize conventions. The latter have 
tended to split between asking two types of questions that emphasize one of the characteristics 
at the expense of the other. These questions can be formulated as follows: 
 
 (Q1) Which mechanisms make actors conform to X rather than Y?
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 (Q2) How come X has become the convention and not Y? 
 
Q1-type questions usually ask how conventions are maintained synchronically and focus 
typically, though not necessarily, on individual behaviour. Q2-type questions focus instead on 
the diachronic emergence of conventional behaviour: the sequence of events that led to the 
establishment of a convention. Synchronic and diachronic analyses typically have different 
objectives and employ different methods. Synchronic approaches seek to determine the 
relevant factors contributing to the maintenance of the convention through theoretical 
abstraction; they satisfy social scientists’ thirst for generalization and prediction. Diachronic 
explanations are genetic accounts linking chains of events through historical narrative; they 
emphasize the contingent interplay of agency and structures over time. 
 Our juxtaposition of synchronic and diachronic accounts of convention in this paper 
reveals their mutual interdependence. Analytical treatments of convention structured around 
responses to Q1 that ignore Q2 provide partial and incomplete accounts of coordination.  
Reference to the past, either through the power of precedent or the weight of habit and 
tradition, is a crucial and inevitable background assumption. Conversely, historical treatments 
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structured around responses to Q2 that downplay Q1, though they may provide rich 
descriptions of the emergence of conventions, do not explain satisfactorily why these exercise 
any normative pull on actors. 
 Though we draw on a wide range of approaches from across the social sciences, our 
paper does not attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the literature on conventions. 
Rather, it focuses on a number of exemplary contributions that highlight different ways in 
which conventional phenomena might be analysed. Section I introduces the EC literature to 
which we hope to make a contribution. At the same time, we highlight a potential weakness of 
the approach stemming from how its central category is characterized. 
 Section II addresses the problem posed by Q1 through a discussion of the synchronic 
mechanisms that are held to support the normativity of conventions. Section III addresses the 
problems raised by Q2 by discussing diachronic accounts of the formation and transformation 
of conventions. Section IV seeks to provide a corrective to some of the limitations we 
perceive in the accounts discussed. Using the Transformational Model of Social Activity 
(TMSA, see Bhaskar 1998[1979]), we propose a realist processual conception of the social 
that emphasises the connection between individual activities and social forms.  
 
Section I – The conventionalist approach 
In recent years, the conventionalist approach or EC has become highly influential in social 
theory and economic sociology (Latsis 2006; Biggart and Beamish 2003; Wagner 1994). It is 
founded on a critical reaction to the theoretical limitations imposed by both structuralist 
macroscopic approaches and individualistic approaches such as rational choice theory.  
 The conventionalist approach within sociology has been developed and defended by 
EC authors Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (2006[1991]) who describe six generalizable 
conventions, or ‘orders of worth’ that underpin our everyday forms of justification. The major 
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innovation of their approach has been first to identify this plurality of forms of justification 
and worth and second to engage with the question of how they are sustained and deployed by 
social actors. According to Boltanski and Thévenot, these generalizable conventions are the 
ultimate source of normativity for social actors, who move from one order to another 
depending on context
5
. These ideas have been applied to a variety of social phenomena 
including unemployment (Salais, Baverez, and Reynaud 1986), agriculture (Allaire and Boyer 
1995), cultural practices (Lamont and Thévenot 2000 ) and manufacturing (Salais and Storper 
1997). Most of these studies rely on the notion of convention as a key concept, though it often 
remains primitive and unarticulated. The latter is unsurprising given the diversity of the 
contributions and the fact that Boltanski and Thévenot’s book notoriously contains scant 
explicit reference to convention. So we might legitimately ask what conventionalists are 
attempting to pick out by designating some social phenomena as conventions and not others?  
 Whilst early contributions seem to under-specify the key theoretical notion of 
convention, it would be unfair to suggest that conventionalists have taken no interest in 
conceptual questions. An elegant review of the conceptual tools of the EC by Christian Bessy 
and Olivier Favereau (2003) has proposed a definition of convention as a ‘representation of 
the collective [world] associated to a satisfactory functioning of [the] relation [between 
agents]’6 (Bessy and Favereau 2003: 12). The authors introduce this definition in order to 
distinguish conventions from similar concepts that are more commonly used in the social 
scientific literature. According to Bessy and Favereau’s definition, conventions are 
frameworks of reference that are located at the individual, cognitive level. This provides an 
immediate contrast with the more commonly used concept of ‘institution’ which they treat as 
a collective, social, object. 
 Though Bessy and Favereau’s proposed separation of social institutions and individual 
conventions clarifies their position, we fear that it creates at least as many problems as it is 
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likely to resolve (Latsis 2006). By associating conventions with the mental states of 
participants, Bessy and Favereau overlook key aspects of what the term commonly refers to. 
In particular, the causal relations between social conventions and individual mental states are 
difficult to conceptualize within their mentalistic framework since conventions are both 
referents and products of our representations. If conventions were reducible to the 
representations of agents, then how can we make sense of the difference between my 
representation of the convention of left-hand side driving and the convention of left-hand side 
driving? 
 An additional difficulty comes from how Bessy and Favereau contrast ‘convention’ 
with related concepts such as ‘social norm’ or ‘institution’. On the one hand, having adopted a 
mentalistic characterization of convention, they fail to provide a clear distinction between 
conventions and the more prevalent notion of ‘social norm’7 which could be treated as 
synonymous. On the other hand, they base their distinction between institutions (which are 
broadly seen as normatively binding social forms) and conventions entirely on the role of 
mental representation in the latter.  We are sympathetic to the definitional problems faced by 
Bessy and Favereau in light of the fact that the term ‘institution’ has a wide and messy range 
of application within the social sciences (for a vivid illustration, see Clemens and Cook 1999). 
However, our analysis suggests that, should one wish to preserve the categorical distinction 
between conventions and institutions, arbitrariness offers a better criterion than mental 
representation.  
A discussion of the arbitrariness and normativity of conventions is thus of potential 
benefit to the conventionalist approach and may also clear the ground for other approaches 
that focus on one aspect of convention whilst neglecting the other. 
 
Section II (a) – Synchronic accounts of convention 
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The game theoretic approach to convention is worthy of discussion in virtue of its analytical 
elegance, simplicity and the fact it can claim to relieve the tension between normativity and 
arbitrariness – at least by its own standards. By formalizing convention in the language of 
rational choice, game theorists have provided an account of why it is ‘rational’ (and hence, it 
is tacitly presumed, normative) to follow a convention whilst retaining the idea that 
conventions are arbitrary through the notion of multiple coordination equilibria.  
 The father of the modern game theory of conventions, David Lewis (1969) sees 
conventions as arising from situations where agents have a mutual coincidence of wants and 
uses the theory of coordination games to delineate their formal properties.  A coordination 
game is defined as an interdependent decision by two or more agents where preferences 
coincide and where there are two or more coordination equilibrium strategies.  Coordination 
equilibrium strategies are defined as situations in which the players would not have wanted to 
act otherwise after the outcome has been reached.  A number of different situations, including 
games where there is conflict between agents, can be accommodated within this basic 
structure
8
. Lewis describes two rowers adjusting the frequency of their strokes through a 
process of mutual observation and adjustment and campers collecting firewood dispersing in 
opposite directions rather than all searching in the same area. 
 In these typical Lewisian situations, players are faced with a problem: how should they 
coordinate around one of a number of satisfactory possible outcomes, given that any 
coordinated behaviour is preferable to coordination failure? A solution commonly proposed 
by game theorists is that, once a convention exists, conformity of behaviour can be achieved 
by reference to precedent. Information about past iterations of the game provides agents with 
reasons to employ ‘salient’ strategies that have been successfully employed in the past. 
Precedent leads to the formation of expectations about future behaviour, which, in turn, leads 
to conformity in the actions of individuals. More generally, game theory provides a rational 
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choice explanation of the maintenance of convention that relies on the idea that agents will 
conform to an established practice because their desire for coordination outweighs their 
desire for any potential alternative practice 
Past equilibria provide the basis for future coordination but the question of how a 
convention comes to be adopted that is traditionally answered by diachronic accounts is 
ignored. Thus, game theory’s claim to reconciling the tension between arbitrariness and 
normativity comes at a price as Q2-types of questions are deemed a priori to be irrelevant. 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for coordinated outcomes are simply assumed to hold. 
Outside the strict limits imposed by traditional rational choice theory, however, one 
can identify other individual mechanisms that underpin conventional behaviour. John 
Maynard Keynes studied the influence of imitation in his discussion of financial conventions 
in the General Theory (Keynes 1936: 156). Fear and lack of confidence in forecasts, as well 
as the incentives faced by market participants are thought to be responsible for the adoption of 
a herd mentality that is highly reactive to the news and focused on short-term considerations 
of survival rather than strategic calculation. But, rather than succumbing to irrational hysteria, 
imitative behaviour is held up by Keynes as an attempt to ‘save our faces as rational economic 
men’ (Keynes 1936: 214). If an individual is faced with non-calculable uncertainty and has no 
reasonable grounds to form expectations about the future, imitation of a neighbour – who 
cannot be in a worse epistemic position, but may be in a better one – could lead to improved 
performance (Orléan 1989). In the case of financial markets, conventional practices related to 
the valuation of intangible financial instruments could spread through a process of ‘mimetic 
contagion’. The latter is a self-reinforcing process: as the number of people coalescing around 
a particular convention increases, so does its attractiveness to people who previously failed to 
conform (Orléan 1989). 
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 Calculation and imitation both seek the normative foundations of conventions in 
individual self-interest. However, other synchronic approaches emphasize different 
psychological and sociological mechanisms, some of which cannot be reduced to calculative 
self-interest. Critiques of game theoretic approaches to convention have pointed out the 
tension between the desire to formalize human interaction and the reality of conventional 
practices. Theories that emphasize the family resemblance between convention and agreement 
have been crucial to this (Gilbert 1989). The conventions of a community are usually 
described in moral language, though they are rarely consciously followed and lack the rigidity 
of moral rules. Margaret Gilbert’s (1983) examples of such conventions include: sending 
thank-you cards following a dinner party, not kissing people upon greeting them in public 
unless they are a family member, and requiring that poetry uses rhyme. Agreement theory 
explains this quasi-moral aspect of conventions by claiming that they are conditional on the 
tacit joint acceptance of principles of action (Gilbert 1989: 373).  These principles take a fiat 
form: they are stipulated rather than justified by reference to some higher order normative 
framework such as the common good or self-interest.  
 Agreement theory presents a plausible case for extending rational choice approaches, 
whilst remaining focussed on individual psychology. It replaces assumptions about individual 
calculative rationality with the myth of an original contract and explains synchronic 
coordination through this contractarian device. Like game theoretic models, it privileges one 
mechanism as the explanation of conventional behaviour and excludes others. In addition, like 
game theory, it cannot hope to answer the diachronic question which is dismissed by the idea 
of tacit joint acceptance of the contract (Latsis 2005: 715–8 ). 
 By focusing on psychological mechanisms, all three of the aforementioned approaches 
exclude another important mechanism for the reproduction of conventional behaviour that has 
been much discussed in anthropology and sociology: habit
9
. Habits or embodied dispositions, 
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functioning below the level of language and individual cognition, are thought by many to be 
an essential precondition of both self-interested and quasi-moral behaviour. The automatic 
feel of conventional practices related to table manners or dress is plausibly the product of 
habitual adaptation to communal discipline.  Indeed, one might argue that this view of 
conventional behaviour is implicit in any account of conventions that emphasizes their ‘tacit’ 
dimension.  
The problem with using embodied dispositions alone to explain conventional 
behaviour is that they cannot adequately account for the normativity of conventions 
(Bernasconi-Kohn 2007). Indeed, it is worth recalling that Bourdieu’s notion of habitus 
claims to transcend the notion of habit as it also includes ‘schemata of perception, 
appreciation and action’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 16). Whilst psychological approaches 
can explain why one practice is selected through self-interest, fear, or shared commitment, 
dispositional accounts must find the normative force of conventions elsewhere. This is 
because habits are ingrained and unthinking: they might explain the way we act automatically 
or routinely, but they do not tell us how we ought to act when faced with an unfamiliar 
situation without appealing to some higher order principle. To be clear, our point is not that 
habits play no role in unfamiliar situations, and we accept the Aristotelian idea that nurturing 
virtuous dispositions equips us better for unprecedented situations. Our point is rather that 
habit, though it may be necessary, is not sufficient to explain our ability to behave 
conventionally in the face of novel situations. 
Conversely, acts of improvization in mundane situations have been extensively studied 
by ethnomethodological approaches (Garfinkel 1984[1967]; Pollner 1987; Sudnow 2001). 
Ethnomethodology presupposes that even those practices that are viewed as most ‘natural’ 
and ‘normative’ by participants draw their factuality and normativity from the ongoing 
ethnomethods informing the practices through which social order is continuously produced 
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and recognized. While ethnomethodology offers insightful inquiries into synchronic Q1-types 
of questions, it does not address, to our knowledge, diachronic Q2-types of questions. The 
latter are recognised though left to the efforts of other authors such as Norbert Elias (Cf. 
Pollner 1987: 143–7).  
We shall revisit in our presentation of diachronic accounts of convention the idea that 
chronologically anterior social forms could be sources of normativity, but it is worth noting 
first some prima facie arguments for going beyond approaches that seek to explain 
conventional behaviour by reference to purely individual mechanisms. 
 
Section II (b) – Some problems with synchronic accounts 
Each synchronic account of convention discussed above focuses on a different mechanism for 
the production of conventional behaviour and we have suggested that conventions are not 
likely to be explained exclusively in terms of any one of these mechanisms. But furthermore, 
there are several other factors (irreducible to human motives and thoughts) that are crucial to 
conventional behaviour.  
 However one conceives of them, conventions never exist in a social vacuum
10
. The 
desire to dissect and provide a reductive analysis in terms of individual thoughts and actions 
obscures the fact that specific conventions are always embedded in networks comprising 
numerous social forms, including other conventions, but also more formal social rules, legal 
codes, organizations, (typically asymmetrical) relations of power, etc. These social forms are 
typically internally related and interdependent; they can be mutually reinforcing or 
undermining. Explaining the persistence of a specific convention will therefore often require 
an account of its interaction with related social forms.  
 Consider, for instance, the oft-cited example of driving. A standard, individualistic, 
synchronic account would conceptualize driving in isolation. Coordination games (for 
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example) do not provide the tools to theorise the interdependence of driving practices and the 
habits and conventions that constrain and enable pedestrians or car manufacturers. Switching 
from right hand to left hand driving is not merely a matter of coordination between drivers. It 
requires changes to positioned practices such as pedestrian behaviour, to symbolic forms such 
as road signs and marking, as well as transformations of technological objects such as cars’ 
interiors. Even the simplest examples of social etiquette like hand shaking or bowing are 
highly contextual and couched in a rich network of social relations and positions. If simple, 
individually based and goal-oriented practices like driving are impossible to isolate from 
attendant social arrangements, it is unlikely that more complex collective practices will be 
isolable. 
 The idea that conventions are nested in networks of other more or less enduring social 
forms also highlights their effects on asymmetrical relations of power between participants. 
The observation that conventions are arbitrary and that the coordination they ensure could be 
achieved some other way can obscure the fact that the adoption of one convention rather than 
another often has significant consequences for participants’ social status. Incumbent 
conventions will tend to solidify both relations of power and access to scarce resources within 
the community in which they hold sway. For instance, business and educational conventions 
may play a significant role in the entrenchment of class divisions (Bourdieu and Passeron 
1970; Archer 1979).  
The role of conventions in the production and reproduction of identities and social 
status can also explain why participants sometimes quarrel passionately about conventions 
that can appear rather insignificant to an external, uninformed, observer (Al-Amoudi, 2010). 
Think, for instance, of Bourdieu’s (1994) analysis of the quarrel of the hats – under the reign 
of Louis XIV – between the First President of the parliament, the princes of the blood and the 
peers. The quarrel, as reported in Saint-Simon’s Memoirs (Saint-Simon 1856: tome 11, chap. 
14 
 
XVIII), turned on the question of whether the First President could dispense with wearing his 
hat when greeting the peers, thereby treating them in the same way as the princes of the blood. 
As Bourdieu (1994: 151–2) remarks, this quarrel sounds pointless and even ridiculous to a 
reader from the twentieth century. Admittedly, contemporary readers might share a common 
concern for proper respect with their eighteenth century ancestors. However, the specific 
conventional form through which respect is attributed in the quarrel of the hats is quite foreign 
to an early twenty first century reader. It is hard to see how the latter could be expected to 
share the indignation that permeates Saint-Simon’s account. 
 To recap, we have so far proposed that calculative self-interest is only one mechanism 
amongst others. Interdependency with other social forms, habit, imitation, joint commitment, 
ethnomethods, the preservation of relations of power and their associated identities may all 
play an important role in the synchronic maintenance of a convention. But our discussion thus 
far does not explain how these diverse mechanisms coalesce over time.  This is the question to 
which we now turn. 
 
Section III (a): Diachronic accounts of conventions  
Little has been written about the emergence of social conventions that explicitly invokes their 
inter-connection with economic self-interest, habit, agreement or identity. One remarkable 
contribution is provided by Norbert Elias’s Civilizing Process (Elias 1978[1939]) in which he 
traced the development of Europe’s complex social order in relation to conventional practices 
relative to violence, table manners, sexual behaviour, forms of speech, and bodily functions. 
Although he does not use the term ‘convention’, the practices that he analyses are clearly 
conventional in nature and display the arbitrariness and normativity that we have alluded to 
above. Whilst Elias’s approach is exemplary in many ways, he focuses more on the influence 
of the overall system of relations on individual manners and mental states than on the reverse 
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influence of conventional practices on wider social relations. A noteworthy exception is 
provided, however, in those passages in which conventional change is attributed to royal 
whims which bear in turn on the social order of court society. Elias traces, for instance, how 
Louis XIV cultivated a network of conventions through which he distributed ‘faveur royale’ 
and ensured his domination over the Princes of the Blood. He has, however, little to say about 
how commoners also played a role in the emergence of novel conventional practices.  
Another diachronic approach, the growing literature on path-dependence and 
standardization in economic history, gives a better insight into the latter. This research 
programme studies how agents in decentralized conditions of decision-making can end up 
coalescing around a sub-optimal standard. In this context standards are seen as specific 
convention about a product’s (usually technical) characteristics.  
David’s (1985; 1987) study of the emergence of the QWERTY keyboard constitutes a 
case in point. As the story goes
11
, the QWERTY keyboard is significantly less effective for 
speedy typewriting than alternatives such as the Dvorak keyboard and yet it was adopted 
instead. One historical reason for QWERTY’s success is that it was intentionally developed to 
minimize the jamming that was so frequent in the first typewriters. But then, how could the 
QWERTY keyboard remain the standard long after the early jamming issues were solved 
through technological improvements? David identifies three mechanisms that contribute to 
determining the locking-in of a sub-optimal standard: inter-relatedness, system scale 
economies and quasi-irreversibility of investment. In the case of the QWERTY keyboard, 
there was a relatively strong inter-relatedness between machines and typists touch-memory; 
economies of scale were appreciable to typists who would rather be trained on the dominant 
standard; and typists were not particularly eager to re-learn a different keyboard once they had 
become familiar with QWERTY. 
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 David’s account, like Elias’s, has the merit of highlighting the importance of history in 
the evolution of conventions. As he puts it, situations of emergence of new standards are 
better understood as non-ergodic systems that can have more than one point of equilibrium.  
 
Section III (b) – Some problems with diachronic accounts 
We believe there is much more to say about the adoption of new conventions than what these 
diachronic approaches allow. The agential powers of participants, in particular, appear to have 
been systematically underplayed in both approaches. This, in turn, contributes to obscuring 
the powers of some participants whilst magnifying those of others. 
As we argued above, in Elias’s accounts, the king is portrayed as the only agent 
endowed with transformative social powers. His subjects are represented, at best, as agents 
capable of understanding and adapting their behaviour to the social order thus generated. 
Similarly, in David’s accounts, people are agents for only one instant. That is, at the point 
when they choose which technology they want to adopt. David’s theory assumes that what 
happened before this instant of decision and what will happen after it is either independent of 
the agent’s will or is irrelevant to the emergence of a new standard. 
In addition to the assumption of ‘punctual’ agency, the scope and nature of actions 
afforded to participants in David’s analysis is questionable. In the story of QWERTY, for 
instance, the range of actions available to agents varies significantly depending on whether 
the agent is an ‘entrepreneur’ or whether s/he is a ‘typist’. Entrepreneurs are assumed to seek 
the most economically efficient product for their business. Their actions are oriented towards 
private profit, which they seek to generate through attempts to create and promote 
technological improvements. In David’s account, they are clearly endowed with stronger 
agential power than other types of participants. Indeed, entrepreneurs are assumed to be able 
to distance themselves from existing standards or conventions. They can create both 
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technological improvements and new standards; they are even capable of engaging in 
lobbying to increase the dissemination of the standards they have invested in. 
The scope of action of non-entrepreneurs regarding the diffusion, transformation and 
replacement of standards is, however, reduced to adopting one standard rather than another. 
By reducing the agency of most participants to a mere choice between adopting standard A 
versus adopting standard D, David is able to isolate the mechanism of positive feedback 
through which, once a critical mass of users is formed randomly, convergence around a 
standard follows. Moreover, this simple mathematical model allows David (1987) to describe 
the patterns of path-dependence in relation to the expected evolution of returns that may be 
constant, increasing or decreasing. 
What is missing from David’s assumptions about the agency of both entrepreneurs and 
typists and its consequences for our understanding of the emergence of conventions? There is 
striking contrast between David’s account and the story of the early days of the typewriter as 
it has been narrated by Weller (1918), a close friend of Christopher Scholes the alleged 
inventor of the typewriter. Weller recounts, for instance, how the inventors had to piggyback 
on an existing convention of testimonial transcription at play in the judicial system in order to 
commercialize the first typing services. Viewed from the perspective of Scholes’s friend, their 
situation was nothing like a situation in which potential adopters waited patiently to be 
prompted on whether they wanted to adopt a new standard. Rather, adopters contributed 
significantly to the evolution of the typewriter’s standard keyboard, especially during the 
earlier phases when the ‘lock in’ was looser and when they were positioned as customers 
rather than workers.  
Whilst we agree that the scope of action of participants depends on their social 
position, we have difficulties with the a priori assumption that some specified group of agents 
is capable of transforming the sets of conventions whilst others are only capable of choosing 
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which convention they will adopt. The latter is a powerful (and empirically questionable) 
assumption that should, at the very least, be subjected to investigation. Whilst people in 
different social positions enjoy different powers, we question the validity of any depiction of 
innovation or entrepreneurship that ignores the social conditions of monarchs’ and 
entrepreneurs’ actions. Path-dependence theory leaves us, it seems, with the following 
question: how can we frame an account of the evolution of conventions that recognizes both 
the agentive powers of ‘adopters’ and the social conditions that enable and constrain the 
action of ‘innovators’ and ‘entrepreneurs’?  
 
Section IV – Process and the ontology of convention 
Despite the problems we have identified in section I with the explicit formulations of 
conventions emanating from the EC, applied contributions within the EC research programme 
have implicitly invoked a broader and more processual notion of convention than any of the 
approaches described above. Even when the language remains superficially mentalistic, the 
word ‘convention’ is often employed to refer to social objects that are not reducible to mental 
states. A vivid example is provided by Salais’s pioneering discussion of the crystallisation of 
employment conventions through the ‘models’ of statisticians, jurists and workers (Salais, 
Baverez, and Reynaud 1986). Moreover, we believe that, by considering the process of 
justification rather than the end-state of (justified) affairs, the EC opens the way to processual 
studies of the formation and reproduction of convention that transcend the entrenched 
distinction between synchronic and diachronic approaches whilst offering a more realistic 
account of the role and limits of agency than those approaches surveyed in section III. In this 
section, we attempt to extend and clarify this insight by drawing on the social ontology 
provided by realist social theory that developed while attempting to theorise the agency-
society connection without falling back into the shortcomings of determinism and voluntarism 
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(Archer 1995; Bhaskar 1998[1979]; Sayer 2000). This literature provides the tools to develop 
the processual approach to conventions within a systematic and analytically rigorous 
philosophical framework (for an earlier discussion along similar lines, see Latsis 2005). 
A common pitfall identified by Bhaskar (1998[1979]) consists in suggesting, 
following Berger and Luckmann (1967), that people and society are dialectically related and 
that ‘society is an objectivation or externalization of human beings. And human beings, for 
their part, are the internalization or reappropriation in consciousness of society.’ (Bhaskar 
1998[1979]: 33). In such a picture, people, through their activities, create social forms. The 
latter are, in turn, objectified from the activities that produced them and confront agents as 
external, coercive facts. In other words, structures are constraints on human activities while 
human activities are creative of structures. The diachronic account of the emergence of 
QWERTY keyboards in a situation of path-dependence seems to implicitly adopt this point of 
view. This results in a theory that distinguishes between moments of ‘decision’ during which 
‘adopters’ exert a sovereign choice over which convention they wish to adopt and the rest of 
the time, during which they have little or no impact on the transformation of existing 
conventions. 
 What is missing from this framework is that, on the one hand, structures are necessary 
to each and every human activity and, on the other, human activities reproduce and transform 
social structures without creating them ex-nihilo (Bhaskar 1998[1979]: 33–4). Rather than 
considering agency and structure as two dialectically related aspects of one and the same 
process, the approach on which we base our argument considers agency and structure as 
ontologically distinct though existentially interdependent: social forms are the pre-existing 
material causes of human activities. 
 The expression ‘material cause’ deserves more attention, both because it is potentially 
confusing to authors unfamiliar with Bhaskar and because it is a distinctive feature of our 
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realist, processual, perspective (Archer 1995; Bhaskar 1998[1979]; Lewis 2000; Martins 
2011; Pratten 2009). Material causality, along with formal, efficient and final causality, are 
the basic elements of Aristotle’s fourfold account of causation. Realists have defended a 
number of modern variants of this Aristotelian approach to causation against the Humean 
accounts that dominate mainstream analytic philosophy and the empirical social sciences. 
However, it is not yet clear whether all four causes can be sufficiently disambiguated to be 
analytically applicable to the analysis of the social realm. Bhaskar (1998[1979]) and Lewis 
(2000) restrict their discussions to the distinction between efficient and material causation, 
whereas Pratten (2009) introduces the notion of final cause and Martins (2011) goes further 
by developing conceptions of both formal and final causality
12
.  
The distinction between efficient and material cause is, nevertheless, unanimously 
accepted and is typically the first step in all such realist analyses of causation in the social 
realm. Aristotle’s metaphor of the clay used in a sculpture best conveys the distinction as it 
has been developed and defended in the recent literature. The actions of a sculptor are the 
efficient cause responsible for the production of an artefact, but the clay with which she works 
is the artefact’s material cause: it has particular emergent properties resulting from its atomic 
or molecular structure that will only allow it to be shaped and moulded in certain ways.  The 
analogy is extended to the social realm by noting that although they are not physical objects, 
social forms, much like the sculptor’s clay, pre-exist social activity and are the primary 
material that is transformed and reproduced through it. For example, when two people get 
married, they simultaneously rely on and contribute to the reproduction of the institution of 
marriage. The act of getting married both presupposes the social form of marriage and 
reproduces it.  From this perspective social structures are both enabling and constraining of 




 What are the implications for the study of conventions? A significant implication is 
that conventional social orders, conventional activities, and representations of conventions 
must be recast as the simultaneously interacting elements of a process of reproduction and 
transformation. In this process, conventional activities (as well as behaviour and thought) are 
the efficient cause and conventional social orders are the material cause. It follows from this 
processual perspective that no account of the diffusion of conventions can dispense with an 
account of the transformation of those conventions that preceded it. As we have shown in 
section II, synchronic accounts cannot avoid assuming certain background conditions 
including details about the historical situation out of which a convention emerges. As 
important as they may be, psycho-sociological mechanisms such as economic self-interest, 
habit, imitation or the preservation of relations of power and associated identities offer only a 
partial account of why X is the convention and not Y. An important part of the explanation of 
why X and not Y is the convention lies in the story of what happened to W, the convention 
that pre-existed X and Y.  
A second implication is that accounts of the diffusion (or disappearance) of a 
convention must seek causal explanations at several levels: events, thoughts and social 
mechanisms. Studies carried out at the level of events should be complemented by studies that 
engage the level of individual reflexive deliberation as well as (realist) studies that engage the 
level of social mechanisms. Third person narrations of the evolution of conventions must, 
therefore, be complemented by first person accounts. Whilst the description of agents’ 
activities is a necessary aspect of the account, it is insufficient as long as the thoughts, 
feelings and desires of participants are not studied and interpreted. The latter form of 
hermeneutic analysis is partly grasped in biographies and histories of ‘great men’. Moreover, 
if Bhaskar’s views are accepted, these first and third person accounts must also be completed 
with a study of the social forms that enable and constrain the actions and representations of 
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agents. Whether the specific structural features of a given setting were propitious or 
adversarial to the transformation of existing conventions is, we suggest, an important though 
understudied question for the analysis of specific conventions and their genesis.  
A third implication of our processual perspective is that conventions, like other social 
forms, are continuously subject to transformation even when it remains unperceived by 
agents. The delimitation of their identity and boundaries is imprecise and difficult to track. 
For instance, it is often hard to distinguish a case where a current convention changes 
gradually over time from its transformation into a new convention. The traditional way of 
dealing with this problem has been to posit a linguistic formulation of a convention as the 
convention, and then set about identifying the conditions under which it is infringed.  This 
approach suffers from the well-known problems associated with the interpretation of rules 
that have been raised about rule-based accounts of social life (Winch 1990[1958]: esp. 25–39  
and 57–65), which we will not develop here.   
A fourth implication is that, contrary to the impression conveyed by the treatment of 
QWERTY keyboards in Paul David’s work, users play a continuous role in the dynamics of 
(re)production and transformation. The influence of participants on a convention has both 
methodological and ethical implications. Every time a person adopts a convention, he or she 
also contributes to its reproduction; and conversely, by refraining from adopting a given 
convention, s/he contributes to its disappearance, replacement or, at least, transformation into 
a different convention.  
In effect, a single instance of transgressing a given convention can have shallower or 
deeper effects on the convention itself, depending on whether and how it is justified. When 
the breach is justified by reference to contingent reasons, the convention itself is unlikely to 
be put into question. However, if the transgression is not justified by reference to accidental 
circumstances, and if the transgressor is deemed to be a competent participant acting 
23 
 
legitimately, then the convention’s normativity is challenged and is likely to become less and 
less respected as the number of accepted breaches increases. Such concern with conventions’ 
moral worth goes beyond the Aristotelian injunction to cultivate virtuous dispositions. It is not 
only our individual inclinations that must be evaluated and cultivated or amended but also the 
conventional social forms that constitute our society (see Bhaskar (1986; 1998[1979]) and 
Collier (1994) for a full exposition of internal critique from a realist perspective). 
 
Conclusion 
We have shown that analyses of conventions typically belong to one of two broad classes: 
synchronic and diachronic accounts. This dichotomy serves to perpetuate the tension that we 
have claimed is inherent in the technical usage of the term. On the one hand, we have seen 
how the coexistence of normativity and arbitrariness is problematic if we view conventions 
synchronically. Existing accounts offer a range of motives for convention following but must 
leave the question of how conventions emerge unanswered. By leaving the question of origins 
aside, synchronic accounts trivialise the arbitrariness of conventions. Once established, a 
convention is unbreakable because its very existence provides sufficient reason for continued 
coordination. On the other hand, diachronic approaches have the advantage of studying the 
arbitrariness of conventions through detailed historical analysis, but they achieve this by 
underplaying normative constraints for some categories of actors and individual agency for 
others. The reasons why a convention should be followed by some particular individuals and 
the transformative powers of most participants disappear.  
 Combining the theoretical insights of the EC with the processual social ontology 
outlined above casts new light on how to resolve these problems. Indeed, they disappear if we 
adopt a (realist) processual perspective, denying the received wisdom that the origins and the 
dynamics of social systems can be analytically separated. The adoption of a new convention is 
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not the creation of a social form ex-nihilo, but a transformation of antecedent social forms. 
The twin questions that opened the paper can be reframed in processual terms:  
 
Q1: Which mechanisms make actors conform to X rather than Y? 
Q1*: Which mechanisms make actors conform to X rather than Y today? And which 
made them conform to the antecedent convention W in the past? 
Q2: How come X has become the convention and not Y? 
Q2*: Through what processes was antecedent convention W transformed into current 
convention X and not Y? 
 
Returning to the example of the convention of left-hand driving; our approach 
suggests that we should consider those conventions that precede it chronologically (e.g. 
avoiding unnecessary obfuscation of traffic) as necessary though insufficient elements of any 
explanation. Note that the preceding convention does not determine whether one should drive 
on the right or on the left or whether traffic should operate on one side of the road. For 
instance, alternative potentially valid conventions could have consisted in adopting a one-way 
traffic system or even in designing narrower, slower cars. Because left-hand driving is 
underdetermined by the objective of avoiding congestion, the question of how the convention 
emerged is an historical question. However, because left-hand driving became normative for 
drivers once it was established, the question of why people tend to drive on the left and avoid 
driving on the right cannot refer merely to the antecedent convention of avoiding other users 
and must also include an account of the many mechanisms through which the normativity of 
the convention is maintained.  
 In the case of the typewriter the conceptualisation of the evolution of standards is valid 
as long as well-entrenched mechanisms limit the agential powers of adopters. That is, as long 
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as the only option offered to adopters is about adopting standard A rather than standard D. It 
is our thesis that a finer conceptualization of conventional activity is needed to make sense of 
situations in which adopters reproduce or transform conventions as they adopt them. 
 In the last section (IV), we have drawn on realist social theorizing to articulate a 
processual conception of conventions that takes into account the agency of adopters. This 
conception treats conventions as both the outcome and the material basis of conventional 
activities. It suggests analyses of conventions that recast them as social processes in which 
events, thoughts and social mechanisms interact, and in which the boundaries of conventions 
are seldom clear-cut. Ordinary participants also appear to play a role that is more important 
than traditionally assumed. This raises novel moral questions that are not included in classic 
Aristotelian ethics and are largely downplayed by individualistic accounts.  
Faced with the declining socio-cultural integration of our globalized world, people are 
confronted with increasingly diverse conventions. Choosing amongst them (when such choice 
occurs) involves a combination of habit, instrumental calculation (what affects their resources, 
their status, their ability to be heard) and moral reasoning as it is those conventions that we 




                                                 
1
 See Sugden (1989) and Young (1996) for two sophisticated approaches to the study of 
socio-economic conventions. 
2
 The founding document of this approach was published in a French economics journal 
(Dupuy et al 1989). The most influential single contribution remains Boltanki and Thévenot’s 
On Justification (2006[1991]).  
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3
 It is worth stressing that, whilst a convention may or may not be oriented towards human 
flourishing, it is not the unique way of securing such flourishing. According to our 
characterization, if a putative convention has the force of a non-arbitrary moral rule for 
eudaimonistic reasons, then it is not a convention.   
4
 We use the verb ‘to make’ because it provides a generic term covering terms such as oblige, 
incite, give reason for, etc. 
5
 The French literature has consistently interpreted the concept of orders of worth in these 
(conventionalist) terms. As we have already seen, Bessy and Favereau’s conceptual work on 
conventions suggests that – qua representations of the collective – they delineate a conception 
of the correct functioning of that collective. Boltanski and Thevenot’s work on orders of 
worth provides further arguments to elucidate the connection between these (typically local) 
conceptions of collective functioning and more general (in the sense of being more stable over 
space and time), but nevertheless contingent, conceptions of justice. See Boltanski and 
Thevenot (1999) and Latsis et al (2010) for a fuller explanation of these ideas and an account 
of how they fit into the broader interdisciplinary conventionalist tradition. 
6
 Author’s translation.  
7
 A discussion of how the idea of a social norm has been used within sociology and beyond 
deserves more space than we can afford it here. However, some clarification is necessary 
given the obvious overlap between some conceptions of norms and our notion of convention. 
The philosopher of social science Jon Elster provides perhaps the most precise definition of 
norms as ‘non-outcome-oriented injunctions’ (Elster 2009: 196), that is a species of social 
rule that is sustained by collective sanctions against rule-breakers. However, Elster’s 
definition captures only one of two major post-Durkheimian strands in the sociological 
literature: the strand that sees norms as beliefs possessed and deployed by individual agents 
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(Elder-Vass 2010: 117). In a recent survey of the literature on norms, Dave Elder-Vass rejects 
this approach and it’s dominant post-Durkheimian alternative, which equates norms with 
normative beliefs held by a supra-individual agent (2010: 119). His solution to the theoretical 
impasse lies in the newly coined concept of norm-circles (2010: 122–7). 
8
 The study of the influence of RCT on sociology and anthropology deserves more space than 
this paper permits. An example that enjoyed wide circulation is provided by Harris’s (1989) 
analysis of taboos.  
9
 See Camic (1986) for an in-depth discussion of the role played by conceptions of habit in 
social theory. 
10
 In the remainder of this section we are presupposing an emergent social realm that is 
neither reducible to nor supervenient on the actions and thoughts of individuals. This 
‘emergentist’ assumption has been the subject of detailed discussion in recent contributions to 
social theory (Elder-Vass 2007; Porpora 2007; Sayer 2001). 
11
 The account offered by Paul David has been the topic of heated debate, see Liebowitz and 
Margolis (1990).   
12
 Since this is a lively area of debate in realist meta-theory and we cannot develop a full 
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